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NOTES AND COMMENTS
fact that the only expenditures of the Foundation since its establish-
ment had been for a library, the bequest was for educational purposes.
In the light of these two decisions it would appear highly desirable
for draftsmen of wills in which bequests are made to non-charitable
organizations for charitable purposes to use unequivocal charitable trust
terminology in order to avoid litigation and possible unfavorable tax
consequences.
FRANCES H. HALL
Taxation-Sale of a Life Insurance Contract-Capital Gain or
Ordinary Income?
Under a literal interpretation of the capital gain section of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code an endowment or annuity contract would classi-
fy as a capital asset. Accordingly, if the owner of such a contract, having
held it for more than six months, transferred it by a bona fide "sale or
exchange,"2 he would not be statutorily prevented from receiving long
term capital gain treatment on his profit.3
This reasoning was followed by a majority of the Tax Court in the
recent case of Percy W. Phillips,4 where the taxpayer was allowed cap-
ital gains treatment. The transaction involved the sale by taxpayer of a
life insurance endowment contract thirteen days prior to maturity. Tax-
payer received $26,750 in cash for the surrender of all rights, title,
and interest in the contract which at maturity had a value of $27,000.
Although the majority recognized that the taxpayer's paramount motive
for the transaction was to effect a tax saving,5 they held that the en-
dowment contract was a capital asset in taxpayer's hands, that there
was a bona fide sale, that the transaction was not an "agency arrangement
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117, as amended, 65 STAT. 497 (1951) (now INT.
RFv. CoDE or 1954 § 1221). This section lists only those assets which are not
capital assets. Because endowments and annuities are not listed, it follows that
they must be considered capital assets.
2 The words "sale or exchange" do not include surrender of a life insurance or
annuity contract to the obligor wherein the obligee receives payment of an obliga-
tion by terms of the contract. Blum v. Higgins, 150 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1945);
Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Frank J. Cobbs, 39 B.T.A.
642 (1939).
1 "A capital asset under Section 1221 is any property held by the taxpayer
whether or not connected with his trade or business, with certain exceptions that
do not embrace insurance contracts. Since an insurance contract is property,
it must be a capital asset. Consequently, the capital gain provisions applying to
the sale or exchange of a capital asset must be available in respect to insurance
contract exchanges, and a long term capital gain should result if the exchanged
insurance contract has been held for six months or more." Freyburger, Tax
Problents Relating to Life Insurance and Annuity Contracts, 389 INs. L.J. 375, 386(1955).
'P-H 1958 T.C. Rep. Dec. 1 30.87.
'It is well accepted that a taxpayer may legally minimize his taxes or avoid
them completely by lawful means. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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masquerading as a sale," and that accordingly capital gain treatment
should be allowed.
The Commissioner contended that the increment realized by the
taxpayer represented an interest element and that even a sale or exchange
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code would not convert
this ordinary income into capital gain. The majority answered that
the cash value of the contract at the end of each year is fixed by the
terms of the contract and is based upon certain actuarial assumptions.
These assumptions are conservatively computed to insure the solvency
of the company and the soundness of its insurance protection. Fre-
quently, because premium receipts are in excess of the amounts needed
for the conduct of its business, the company will declare dividends, thus
in effect reducing the cost of the contract.0 From these considerations
the court deduced that the excess of the cash value over the net cost of
the policy represented not only accrued interest realized by the tax-
payer on the date of sale, but also favorable actuarial experience and a
rebate of unused operational expense allowance.
In less than a month after the Phillips decision, the United States
Court of Claims, in Arnfield v. United States" denied capital gains treat-
ment to the sale of an annuity contract There, the annuity matured
three days following the taxpayer's complete assignment to a third party.
The court found that this transaction was a bona fide sale within the
meaning of section 117 of the 1939 Code. Admitting that all the other
requisites of the capital gains section of the 1939 Code were met, the
court thought the true issue to be whether taxpayer could convert
ordinary income? into capital gain by selling the contract prior to ma-
turity.
' "Amounts received as a return of premiums paid under life insurance, endow-
ment, or annuity contracts, and the so-called 'dividend' of a mutual insurance com-
pany which may be credited against the current premium, are not subject to tax."
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.2 2 (a)-12 (1943).
' CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 9692.
' The Arnfield court did not cite Phillips although that case was handed down
some sixteen days prior to Arnfield. Neither court cited the case of Jules J. Rien-
gold, P-H 1941 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. 1141,319, where the petitioner purchased a
mature, $100,000 life insurance policy from the beneficiary in 1933 for the sum of$15,000. In 1936 the beneficiary was adjudged an incompetent, and the conservators
instituted suit to avoid the 1933 sale and to recover the policy. In settlement of the
suit the petitioner transferred the policy to the conservators and received a cash
payment of $55,000. The court held that the insurance policy was a capital asset in
the petitioner's hand and allowed capital gains treatment.
.
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b)(2), as amended, 67 STAT. 471 (1951). (now
IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72 (a), (b)). This section includes in gross income
amounts received over and above the contract's cost, except there is allowed a 3%
exclusion per annum for annuity contracts until cost is recovered. The 1954 Code
still includes the gains in gross income, but provides for a different method of
computation, viz., the use of an exclusion ratio to regain the cost of the contract.
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The court found that the facts here fell clearly within the well
-established line of authority' 0 holding that the proceeds received from
a bona fide sale of future income rights are taxable as ordinary income
and not as capital gains. It was contended that this line of authority was
inapplicable because those cases dealt with the sale of a future income
right, whereas, here, taxpayer sold not just the future income right
but rather the entire ownership in the income producing property.
This contention was summarily dismissed as being inconsistent with
Hort v. Commissioner,"z where the court held that a sum received by a
lessor for the cancellation of a lease was taxable as ordinary income
cespite the fact that the lease may for other purposes be treated as
"'property" or "capital."
These two cases, from the facts presented, seem to be indistinguish-
able in principle. Each transaction involved a transfer of all rights, title,
and interest in a contract which had appreciated in value over the years.
Both contracts were destined to mature in the near future and upon
maturity would be taxable as ordinary income. Moreover, there would
not appear to be any difference in the two types of contracts involved
here.12 If, then, the cases are factually the same, why the inconsistency?
The explanation for this inconsistency lies in an understanding of the
avenues of approach that may be taken in evaluating this type of trans-
action. One approach is to concede that the capital gains section is
applicable; and whether capital gain or ordinary income treatment will
be accorded the taxpayer will depend on whether the requisites of that
section are met. For example, the dissent in Phillips argued that the
profit was ordinary income because there had been no "bona fide sale
or exchange" of the endowment contract. On the other hand, it can
just as logically be argued, as did the court in Arnfield, that since section
22(b) (2) of the 1939 Code would require ordinary income treatment
upon maturity of the contract, the premature sale of the contract was,
in effect, a sale of future income and clearly within the Hort line of
10 Commissioner v. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (sale of oil and sulphur payment
rights) ; Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (sale of property rights in a
lease by lessor to lessee) ; Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954)
(sale of corporate notes which were in default both as to principal and interest) ;
Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942) (sale of stock
dividends before they became payable); Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d
Cir. 1937) (sale of partnership interest in earned fees) ; Charles E. Sorenson, 22
T.C. 321 (1954) (sale of stock options given as compensation by taxpayer's em-
ployer).
11313 U.S. 28 (1941). It is to be noted that taxpayer (lessor) merely cancelled
the lease while still retaining the fee to the property.
"' "The problems involving the sale or taxable exchange of an annuity are
basically the same as shown for other insurance contracts. The annuity contract
can be considered a capital asset .... The basis of the annuity sold or exchanged
is cost less any amounts previously recovered tax free." HERzBERG, SAVING TAXES
THROUGH CAPITAL GAINS 21 (1957).
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cases.' 3 In other words, the result of the transaction in form looks
like a capital gain while in substance it is not.
A quote from the dissent in the Phillips case illustrates the need for
a judicial yardstick: "The conclusion which in my opinion cannot be
escaped here might be different where a policy was not about to mature,
or did not have a cash surrender value in an amount close to the full
value at maturity, and where the taxpayer could recover his investment
only through a sale to a third party."'14 The court in Arnjield also
recognized this need when it aptly stated that "the law holds no cer-
tainty in this area."'15
Thus by judicial admission a denial of capital gain benefits in this
area is obviously left to a case by case determination, leaving no definite
boundaries set for taxpayer to follow. Since the stakes are often worth
the gambling, taxpayers do invent technical property devices in an effort
to save taxes. Therefore it is urged that legislation be enacted whereby
taxpayer will be accorded identical treatment on the proceeds of the
policy whether they be obtained from a "bona fide sale or exchange" or
surrender to the company. At present this area is merely a trap for the
unwary.
RICHARD B. HART
Torts-Negligence-Automobiles-Owner's Liability After Leaving
Ignition Key in Lock
The recent case of Williams v. Mickens' presented a question of
first impression in North Carolina. The defendant parked his auto-
mobile on a public street with the key in the ignition switch and left
it unattended. The automobile was subsequently stolen, and shortly
thereafter was involved in a collision with the plaintiff caused by the
negligence of the thief. The plaintiff sued defendant for his negligence
in leaving the key in the ignition on the theory that defendant should
have foreseen that a thief might steal the automobile and drive it negli-
gently. Since there was no statute involved, the court decided the case on
common law principles. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
nonsuit and the supreme court affirmed. Relying on the case of Ward
v. Southern Ry.,2 the court said that, while they were not willing to admit
3 Cases cited note 9 supra.
" P-H 1958 T.C. Rep. Dec. 30.87 at 502.
11 CCH 1958 STAND. FFD. TAX REP. 1[ 9692 at 151.
'247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957).
'206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934). (Plaintiff was killed when struck by a
piece of coal thrown from defendant's car; held, assuming defendant was negligent
in allowing thieves to be on the train, nevertheless, the plaintiff cannot recover
since the intervening criminal assault was unforeseeable.)
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